From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Sean Whitton Subject: Re: Inconsistency between #+OPTIONS and EXPORT_OPTIONS on LaTeX heading levels Date: Sun, 11 Dec 2011 16:01:09 +0000 Message-ID: References: <87ehwbcdcq.fsf@gnu.org> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/signed; boundary="==-=-="; micalg=pgp-sha1; protocol="application/pgp-signature" Return-path: Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([140.186.70.92]:47812) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1RZlq8-0004Nn-VT for emacs-orgmode@gnu.org; Sun, 11 Dec 2011 11:01:28 -0500 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1RZlq4-0003OW-H6 for emacs-orgmode@gnu.org; Sun, 11 Dec 2011 11:01:24 -0500 Received: from athena.silentflame.com ([85.119.82.60]:54558) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1RZlq3-0003OR-Us for emacs-orgmode@gnu.org; Sun, 11 Dec 2011 11:01:20 -0500 Received: from zephyr.localdomain (zephyr.athenet [10.9.8.6]) by athena.silentflame.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 299B41AA6CF for ; Sun, 11 Dec 2011 16:01:16 +0000 (UTC) In-Reply-To: <87ehwbcdcq.fsf@gnu.org> (Bastien's message of "Sun, 11 Dec 2011 16:55:17 +0100") List-Id: "General discussions about Org-mode." List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: emacs-orgmode-bounces+geo-emacs-orgmode=m.gmane.org@gnu.org Sender: emacs-orgmode-bounces+geo-emacs-orgmode=m.gmane.org@gnu.org To: emacs-orgmode@gnu.org --==-=-= Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="=-=-=" --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Hi Bastien, On 11 Dec 2011 at 15:55Z, Bastien wrote: >> When I set #+OPTIONS: H:1, I get what I expect: \section{} is the >> only heading used and second level outline levels are converted to >> whatever my org-export-lower-levels is set to, and the table of >> contents just has the \section{}s in it. >> When I set EXPORT_OPTIONS to H:1, I get \section{} and \subsection{} >> in the body text, but the table of contents only lists \section{}s. > EXPORT_OPTIONS is for a tree, while #+OPTIONS is for the whole doc. Ah perhaps I should have been clearer when describing what I did, sorry. I set #+OPTIONS at the top of the file, and EXPORT_OPTIONS in the properties drawer for the tree I actually want, as you describe, as two cases, and then exported just the tree with C-c C-e 1 d in both cases, to get the behaviour described. The point is that I require the #+OPTIONS to get what I want, when it ought to just work with the EXPORT_OPTIONS since I am just exporting that tree. >> I want the first behaviour myself, but in any case, shouldn=E2=80=99t th= is >> be consistent between the two? > Maybe you can send an org file as an example? Certainly, you=E2=80=99ll find a stripped down file attached. Thanks! S --=-=-= Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Disposition: attachment; filename=optionsinconsistnecy.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable #+OPTIONS: H:1 * Lectures MT11=E2=80=94R Walker=E2=80=94Kant=E2=80=99s Ethics :PROPERTIES: :EXPORT_FILE_NAME: lectures-kantsethics-walker :EXPORT_TITLE: Kant=E2=80=99s ethics lectures :EXPORT_AUTHOR: Lecturer: Ralph Walker :EXPORT_DATE: MT11 :EXPORT_OPTIONS: H:1 todo:nil <:nil :END: ** Lecture 1 *** Kant=E2=80=99s general philosophy A problem how to fit his moral philosophy with his general philosophy, in particular his views on freedom. We need to be free in a very strong sense for his moral system. Pure practical reason doesn=E2=80=99t belong to the causal order yet it must influence us. Theoretical philosophy says that we don=E2=80=99t have this freedom. Most people say this is unresolvable nowadays (not all of them). **** Kant=E2=80=99s crazy metaphysics Kant=E2=80=99s solution is separating world of free agents from world of sp= ace and time. We can know a lot about this world as we rely on both sense experience and principles we know independently of experience: we apply /a priori/ concepts like the concept of cause (disagrees with Hume here). Kant thinks he can prove that this must be true of the world as we can know it. **** Where he=E2=80=99s coming from Kant is reacting first against the rationalists (C&D) and reacting to (British) empiricists. At one stage Kant accepted Hume=E2=80=99s view =E2=88=B5 he wasn=E2=80=99t = happy with rationalists grasping principles out of the air (they all got different things). I say C&D this, you say C&D that. This won=E2=80=99t do because Hume and co. end up in untenable scepticism. Can=E2=80=99t account for indispensible notions like causality, senses objectivity. Geometry and arithmetic tell us truths about space and time, that Hume says we can=E2=80=99t have. ***** Example of incongruent counterparts Left and right hand gloves: problem with empirical philosophy is that it makes sense that there could consist of a universe with just a left hand glove and one with a right hand glove and these would be different. Yet how can they be different without knowledge of space itself? The experiential data is the same in both cases. ***** Unsatisfactory alternatives Obvs. not happy with Descartes=E2=80=99 a priori knowledge of the world due= to god argument failing=E2=80=94also, Kant doesn=E2=80=99t think you can ever = prove the existence of god using reason. **** Metaphysics again Only way to explain things like this is that the world as knowable by humans is dependent on the way that we know it, dependent on us. There is a reality of things as they in themselves beneath this, but we can never know what it is like. ************Isn=E2=80=99t this a bit of a truism? Neurath=E2=80=99s boat.****************** Some kind of faith possible about the real world. Distinguished from knowledge of sensory world. **** Moral truths Doesn=E2=80=99t give a parallel account. He seems to think that moral trut= hs take us beyond the realm of what we can know, and they give us some kind of contact with reality itself=E2=80=94disputed interpretation. Why can we be so confident in our a priori principles (e.g. induction) that govern our experience? They are innate but that=E2=80=99s no guarantee of their reliability. *** The Groundwork itself Written as a semi-popular book. Kant was surprised that first Critique didn=E2=80=99t go down well with the public. Review said Kant was reheating Berkeley=E2=80=99s idealism. Therefore wrote Prolegomena, semi-popular, intended to make everybody understand exactly what he was saying. Failed ofc=E2=80=A6 On ethics he does the popular work first. Kant introduces an idea, doesn=E2=80=99t go into complexities but doesn=E2=80=99t say that there eve= n are complexities. This has caused almost all problems of with understanding the Groundwork. Three formulations do come to the same thing but it=E2=80=99s very hard to = see how they come together as he=E2=80=99s suppressed detail on his initial formulation. Could have put a lot of philosophers out of work if he hadn=E2=80=99t done this. *** Methodology Starting ethics by looking at ordinary people=E2=80=94Plato, Aristotle, Raw= l=E2=80=99s =E2=80=98reflective equilibrium=E2=80=99. **** =E2=80=98Analytic=E2=80=99 and =E2=80=98synthetic=E2=80=99 Has nothing to do with analytic and synthetic propositions at all. Analyse existing beliefs and then build up from truth of morality from, apparently, nowhere. Indeed Kant says we can=E2=80=99t start from nowhere so he says all he can do is remove the objections. *** The Analytic Argument Reveals that morality is essentially rational. All moral philosophy dependent on the part that is pure. Confusion from failure to realise that fundamental principles of morals must be a priori (v. diff. to Mill=E2=80=94Mill says all comes from induction, in what leads to happiness= or not, but greatest happiness principle doesn=E2=80=99t seem to be inductively derived). This is something ordinary people believe, when analysed. Disagrees with Hume, and people who says its evolutionary. Can=E2=80=99t learn them from experience for Hume=E2=80=99s =E2=80=98can=E2=80=99t derive= an ought from an is=E2=80=99. Reason behind all this is that moral principles are action guiding. We can=E2=80=99t recognise something as right or wrong and not be moved by that. Can=E2=80=99t recognise that something is your duty without being motivated= by it (even if you=E2=80=99re more motivated to do something else). **** This is strange When Mackie says that objective facts are weird, he=E2=80=99s talking specifically about Kant. **** Compared to theoretical principles of reasoning We recognise an argument is valid and it=E2=80=99s compelling, but we don= =E2=80=99t have to follow it. Hard to in a basic syllogism but there are many other examples. Mother refuses to believe son is dead in the army. All the evidence she could possibly have yet fails to accept it. **** Ends and means Moral law doesn=E2=80=99t derive value from anything but itself: not god, n= ot because happiness is good (other way round in the last case). Very opposite to position of Mill and Epicureans. Ends derive their value From=20the law, Mill says the other way around. ***** First section=E2=80=94talents and virtues seen as good Aristotelian virtues have no value in themselves. Value only if used in accordance with the demands of morality. All of them can be misused (e.g. cool (courageous) scoundrel). ** Lecture 2 *** Initial few paragraphs Another example of us not following the pull of reason are logical difficulties surrounding impossible triangle of god. There might be ways round this=E2=80=94got to be very careful with one=E2=80=99s own think= ing. Holy wills don=E2=80=99t have imperatives as imperative means possibility of not following it, which god and angels don=E2=80=99t have. Happiness and health can=E2=80=99t be mis-used as virtues can be, but can= =E2=80=99t be good in themselves because if distributed badly they are bad as far as they are distributed to the bad people. Function of reason cannot be to produce happiness. Kant doesn=E2=80=99t normally talk about functions. Explanation: Nichomachean Ethics, which Kant is disagreeing with in these first few sections. Courage not good in itself for Kant, is for Aristotle. Aristotle also says power, honour, health can be a component of the best life, but Kant says not of value in themselves. Nancy Sherman attempts to assimilate Kant to Aristotle; Ralph will be following this. Disagreements are over a caricature of Aristotle coming from Kant himself and common readings. All philosophers do this, inc. Aristotle, when they want to be original or try to reduce their apparent/notice of agreement. Purple passage, step-motherly nature: consequences ABSOLUTELY irrelevant. Not an answer to a more sophisticated form of utilitarianism in terms of intentions (though he=E2=80=99ll object to that = too because /no end has value/ independently of the moral law). *** First proposition Doesn=E2=80=99t enunciate first proposition but reasonable to conclude that= by a later reference to =E2=80=98our second proposition=E2=80=99. Quotation 1= seems to say that you can act morally only if you absolutely hate it. Overstating his case as he often does when trying to make his position readily understood. Considering a special case: initially had no moral inclination and just acting from disposition, which is morally worthless, because liable to be mis-used. Your benevolence must be subordinate to the moral principles which must remain in control. Second-order motive of morality saying whether situation is appropriate for friendliness, first-order motive to be friendly. Still helpful because then you don=E2=80=99t have to struggle to do the rig= ht thing. Praise and encouragement but not esteem due towards such virtues. Aristotle=E2=80=94phroenesis, practical wisdom, controls virtues. Kant tak= ing precisely the same position. Practical wisdom a second order motive. Possible for moral law to be a first order motive but more commonly second order motive. Alan somebody sees duty as having to constrain inclinations. Makes Kant=E2=80=99s position unattractive. Walker thinks it=E2=80=99s not such = a problem when you consider first and second order motives. *** Questions Bernard Williams says Kant psychologically hedonistic. =E2=80=9CBernard Williams not the most reliable person on the people he=E2=80=99s attacking, like everyone else=E2=80=9D. If anything it=E2=80=99s psychological eudaim= onism. An area he doesn=E2=80=99t tell us enough about. Williams right that he gives= a pretty crude picture of acting in non-moral way=E2=80=94cos he wants to deal with it quickly. Kant says there=E2=80=99s a measure of inclination we can never get rid of; can=E2=80=99t train ourselves into the position of god OR when all other inclinations subsumed to morality anyway. Book on religion=E2=80=94radical evil in human beings. =E2=80=9CWe are alw= ays faced ultimately with the choice.=E2=80=9D Always a struggle. Terminology=E2=80=94=E2=80=99right=E2=80=99 if done in accordance with law;= =E2=80=98good=E2=80=99 only if motivated by duty. Splits metaphysics of right=E2=80=94primarily about law=E2=80=94and m of virtue in his Metaphysics of Morals. As for Plato, motivation absolute heart of morals. *** Second proposition Some people say that this makes Kant seem like he cares about no ends. Quotation 5 shows this is wrong. End derives from moral law, not the moral law from the end. Also see Quotation 4. There are ends, that the moral law lays down for us, perfection and happiness. *** Third proposition What does it mean to say a feeling self-produced by a rational concept. Doesn=E2=80=99t mean what we mean by feeling at all: compulsion to act inseparable from an awareness of the moral law. Quotation 6. Reverence is morality itself considered as an incentive. Quotation 7. *** Maxims Quotation 8. Objective maxim is the maxim I adopt when I say I shall obey the moral law; definition doesn=E2=80=99t make this an oxymoron. What Kant expects in a maxim is more than we might ordinarily build into our concept of intention. What I am undertaking needs to be thought our pretty carefully in the formulation of my maxim. Filling out=E2=80=94makes his maxims more intelligible. Commit suicide->commit suicide out of self-love. Maxims should include all morally relevant circumstances. E.g. when drunk, not that there=E2=80=99s no maxim, just not well thought-o= ut, doesn=E2=80=99t incorporate moral law as part of it. You might think you a= re but you would be wrong. Kant does not think that everyone who believes themselves to be acting out of duty is acting out of duty. You can easily be wrong. This is important to avoid a fascile objection to Kant. Genocide, guy on trial, in all relevant circumstances he did think he was doing his duty to categorical imperative. But he hadn=E2=80=99t thought it through enough. Kant acutely aware of the ease with which we are deceived, Quotation 9. Duty won=E2=80=99t necessarily be what you were tau= ght at school or in the Hitler youth. Has example of an inquisitor in late middle ages. Torturing heretics. Didn=E2=80=99t enjoy it but doing it cos it was his duty. This person is confusing an order from other people with the rational moral law and therefore guilty. Not been paying attention to pure (practical) reason. We always do have access to the moral law within us, but this may well require reflection. ** Lecture 3 *** Chapter 1 An initial formulation of the categorical imperative is seen in chapter 1. Will doing the right thing doesn=E2=80=99t /produce/ anything g= ood for itself cos good just doing your duty. Seems strange when he says this then gives formulation=E2=80=A6? What does universal law mean? Binds all rational beings, as such. At 408. Or just means: requires like cases to be treated alike. This is how he uses it but doesn=E2=80=99t seem to follow from the above. A law could be discriminatory though and could bind rational beings, but clearly not treating like cases alike. Slides from one meaning of law to another. =E2=80=98First principle of morality=E2=80=99 used by ordinary conscious is= basic CI. Moral philosophy helps us keep motivations separate but not strictly necessary. **** An Interpretation Quotation 8. =E2=80=98content=E2=80=99 Is he talking about more than what I /want/? Ralph will argue there is something more, a concept of rational willing. Will is not just want/content but rationally will. This passage is evidence against Ralph=E2=80=99s interpretation. But first chapter written less carefully as he knew he=E2=80=99d be coming back to it later. *** Chapter 2 Quotation 1=E2=80=94can=E2=80=99t derive morality from experience. 408 aga= in (not on list of quotations in the end). =E2=80=98apodeictic=E2=80=99 (logically) n= ecessary. Used in Aristotelian logic for a proof, an apodeisis or something. Moral law has same status as logical claims proved with deduction though not acquired through a proof. **** Types of imperatives To have a will is to act in accordance with one=E2=80=99s idea of the law. Has problematic hypothetical imperatives (e.g. getting a hot dog) vs. assertoric hypothetical imperatives, just because he likes triads, latter those that apply to all of us because we all have e.g. desire for happiness. Categorical applies even when we don=E2=80=99t desire happiness. **** Synthetic and analytic Categorical: =E2=80=98synthetic a priori propositions=E2=80=99, hypothetical are =E2=80=98analytic=E2=80=99 which just means don=E2=80=99t raise any pro= blems. Who wills the ends will the means, truth of pure practical reason. Ralph: using =E2=80=98will=E2=80=99 in his technical sense: if rationally want the end, = it=E2=80=99s rational to want the means. Kant doesn=E2=80=99t say it=E2=80=99s impossib= le to will the end but not want the means, but it=E2=80=99s irrational. *** The first formulation Kant postpones dealing with issue of whether there are any categorical imperatives until ch. 3; Mackie would say if they could exist are queer, or we might just say there aren=E2=80=99t any. Kant has given us no ground to say that hair colour is irrelevant when deciding whether sufficiently similar circumstances. Just says that =E2=80=98morally relevant=E2=80=99 circumstances must be taken into account= but this is obviously circular=E2=80=A6 This formulation is leaving an awful lot open. This law can=E2=80=99t rule anything out. Some help offered by later formulations. Reformulates as formula of law of nature. A graphic test, helps us when we have a picture we can imagine. Conforms to parents saying what happens if everyone did that. May not be much use before we know more detail about all this, lots of blanks to fill in. Can yield lots of specific categorical imperatives once we=E2=80=99ve understood the big one. Going to have to bring down to something applicable to our everyday lives. *** Conceiving of a world in which no one makes true promises Inconceivable? No, doesn=E2=80=99t seem to be. Everyone might be stupid enough to think that it=E2=80=99s only them making lying promises. What about bribery? Refusing bribes will collapse if everyone does, so is there no requirement for me not to, is refusing bribes now wrong? Response: Promising has an end prescribed by the moral law and refusing bribes does not. Bribery is wrong, promising isn=E2=80=99t. This isn=E2=80=99t captured in Kant=E2=80=99s description of what=E2=80=99s wron= g with the lying promises case. Couldn=E2=80=99t rationally will it because rationally wills that institution of promising continues but it wouldn=E2=80=99t be rational= to will that bribery continues. Notion of rational willing playing a large part in what=E2=80=99s going on, clearer in neglecting talents example. Fine example, side of Kant we don=E2=80=99t always meet. Kant =E2=80=9Cevidently thinks this would be ra= ther fun=E2=80=9D w.r.t. south sea islands. Can=E2=80=99t do this because as a rational being he must will something else. Rational willing playing same substantive role here as in above case of promising and bribery. =E2=80=98Will=E2=80=99 in formulations is a very loaded concept. Then four= examples become a lot more comprehensible. More formulations to fill out conception of rational will. Possible to have world where we live on our own but couldn=E2=80=99t be rationally willed. Some have taken it as an argument that it=E2=80=99s abo= ut wanting but that doesn=E2=80=99t get us there. Conflict between my duty and my desire again. *** Second formulation: treat people as ends not means @ 429 in Academy version. Caught popular imagination. Useful content. Will deal with making exception to enslave red-haired people. ** Lecture 4 *** First four formulations Formulation 3 is a helpful way of picturing to yourself what would happen and then you ask if you can will it. Exactly the same test as the first two formulations, but just a graphic way of putting it. Quotations 1 and 2 reflect Kant saying a maxim passing the test is admissible but not necessary (he=E2=80=99s sometimes said not to say this). Quotation 2 makes it very explicit. Imagine =E2=80=98let everyone in my circumstances eat meat for dinner=E2=80=99; universalisable but don=E2=80= =99t have to do it. Drinking 14 pints at dinner may actually be morally wrong (probably not universalisable pragmatically and certainly doesn=E2=80=99t t= end to perfection). *** What is a maxim? Your maxim is simply your intention? **** Counter-examples Onora O=E2=80=99Neill uses counter-example, I shall buy toy trains when I w= ant but never sell any. Doesn=E2=80=99t look to be universalisable. You=E2=80= =99re assuming that there=E2=80=99s a market in toy trains. Tacit assumptions, a= nd decision to buy toy trains in a world in which no-one sells them: just can=E2=80=99t have this intention. Another example: I shall walk across the grass. If everyone did it there would be no grass cos it would be a path. =E2=80=98Seems too fast as= a method of dealing with the morality of walking across the grass.=E2=80=99 Actually: I shall walk across the grass given that only a few people want to do so along with me. **** Suicide So: Kant building in more than your explicit intention when he considers maxims (evidence for this coming in a moment). Evidence: examples he goes on to give. =E2=80=98*From self-love*, I will commit suicide, if continuance means more evil than pleasure.=E2=80=99 Critical t= hat case is discussed under this self-love. Contradiction in state of affairs, a contradiction in conception of buying toy trains and no-one selling them and everyone walking across grass. Objective of getting pleasure contradicted by ending life, maybe, but not clear it=E2=80=99s an actual contradiction in /conception/. Based on contingent fact that we often end up rather depressed. In suicide and promise-keeping, a contradiction that every rational being must will. Explicit in third and fourth examples but not in the first two. In non-senile works says there are probably exceptions to stuff such as suicide. He=E2=80=99s not a rigourist. He=E2=80=99s building in motiva= tion, he=E2=80=99s definitely not just saying lying and suicide are =E2=80=98always wrong=E2= =80=99. **** Talents System of nature could exist but a rational being necessarily wills that his talents be developed. Same in fourth example. Must take into account full maxim, background circumstances and motivation, not just what=E2=80=99s present to conscious. *** Forms and matters of maxims Quotation 8. Form and matter. When he says his CI is formal he means it=E2=80=99s general, using =E2=80=98form=E2=80=99 in a different sense. Some say introduction supposed to lead us to formulation 4 in terms of humanity. Two problems: 1) Doesn=E2=80=99t effectively bridge the gap. 2) If we take seriously the notion of rational willing and what we build into it, there may really be no gap to bridge. =E2=80=98Kant is sketching an account which we have to fill out.=E2=80=99 *** Fourth formulation: humanity as an end in itself Are there any ends adopted just from inclination? Hume: reason slave of the passions. Passion=3D=3Dinclination. Hume uses =E2=80=98passion=E2= =80=99 in a very broad way as translation the Greek /pathos/ so much broader than how we would use it. Quotation 3=E2=80=94affirmation. More of an argument with Quotation 5. =E2=80=98confusing footnote=E2=80=99 Two confusing things about this package: firstly footnote. Postulate: give without grounds but suppose it to be rational to take it as true. He has in mind his First Critique views that in spatial-temporal world we=E2=80=99re affected by causes not rational will. Secondly substantive n= ot analytic claim about human beings: every human being necessarily wills (not just that willing is part of defn of human). Class of other beings actual or possible in being like human beings in being able to reason. Must view themselves as ends in themselves. There are definitely humans who are rational but do not think of themselves as ends, subordinate themselves, we might admire such people, Kant doesn=E2=80=99t=E2=80=94rationality requires it. Principle of rationality that is clearly not Humean, very parallel to principles of rational action from Parfit and Tom Nagel. If we weren=E2=80=99t too thoroughly convinced by Hume we would probably agree with these. Irrational to be concerned with happiness now but not (at all (less okay maybe)) tomorrow/next year. Parfit=E2=80=99s example: care across life except on Tuesdays. Very odd, indeed odd enough to warrant the word =E2=80=98irrational=E2=80=99. Oddity not just unfamiliarity, Kant says, but principles of pure practical reason, very similar to status of laws of logic, highly defensible position Ralph will try and defend. Impossible to employ other people, get them to do things that they don=E2=80=99t want to do=E2=80=94unthought out notion of dignity. Quotatio= n 6 is his account. If this means we can never kill anyone, it can=E2=80=99t fit with what Kant says as in other places he says killing in war and capital punishment are okay. Clearer and more obvious in case of promising how I=E2=80=99m abusing someone. Also in talents and helping others. *** Next formulation Kantian constructivism by Rawls, Koorsgarrd, O=E2=80=99Neill. Constructing moral law on basis of our conception of personality. Might be relative to post-enlightenment Europe or might be more general to humanity. He can=E2=80=99t mean that we construct the law individually or = as a group as he says it=E2=80=99s objective. Also not just a law for humans = but for all rational beings as such so can=E2=80=99t depend on personality. Leading up to previous formulation using humanity and rational being interchangeably. Has a lot to say about this in preface of Groundwork. Pure law and then an application of it to human nature, a job for applied ethics which he calls anthropology. So what on earth can he mean be legislating the law if he doesn=E2=80=99t m= ean what the constructivists say? He must mean: we prescribe it to ourselves. Moral law motivating like the laws of logic, not just observable: this is your motivation so a sense in which you=E2=80=99re prescribing the moral law for yourself: or, one part of you does and the other part overrides and you follow inclination. ** Lecture 5 *** Recap Formulation 4 hidden in earlier formulations in notion of rationally willing. =E2=80=98Making law=E2=80=99 paradoxical because law supposed to be binding= on rational beings as such not dependent on me, you, my choice etc. Sounds like one is inventing the law. In line with Kantian constructivism, Koorsgardd, originally from R.P. Wolff and developed by Rawls and O=E2=80=99Neill to accept paradox. But not actually that paradoxical because moral law is an imperative and this is what autonomy requirement requires. Suggests you are your true self only when acting rationally acting in accordance with law. This notion has a very long history. Rousseau, Plato=E2=80=99s /Phaedo/ and probably long before that. Echoed in St. Paul= , =E2=80=98to serve god is perfect freedom=E2=80=99. Same in propaganda of East Germany. Recognising one=E2=80=99s position in the social order. Kant=E2=80=99s use of =E2=80=98freedom=E2=80=99 is autonomy and freedom to = do what you want. Confusing as he uses both in different circumstances. In /Groundwork/ his presentation of the notion of freedom is confusing. In later works, *wille* (True Will) and *willk=C3=BCr* (arbitrary will, more ordinary sense of =E2=80=98will=E2=80=99). When acting contrary to moral law, Willk= ur free and Wille not a free agent in that choice, acting heteronomously according to desire and inclination. *** Kingdom of ends 6 is 5 + 4. Kingdom not necessarily in the sense of requiring a king but if there is a god he can be thought of as the king. Another imaginative test for maxims; doesn=E2=80=99t provide much more. Takes us beyond spatial-temporal world because there may be rational beings that do not belong to it but are equally bound to the moral law. *** Happiness and perfection Quotation 2 is heart of doctrine of virtue and thus must be heart of Kant=E2=80=99s ethics because doctrine of virtue is just the moral law. Th= is is what treating people as ends in themselves amounts to. Promoting perfection of others very rarely have opportunity to do so aside from children focus on ourselves. Why not promote our own happiness, not an obligation because you want to do so anyway. But he also says there are circumstances in which promoting own happiness is a duty, Quotation 3. *** Gap: practical ethics Book on Robert Lowden on reading list =E2=80=9CKant=E2=80=99s Impure Ethics= =E2=80=9D=E2=80=94his practical ethics and how they don=E2=80=99t follow from fundamental princip= les articulated in these books. Gap over what is meant by treating people as ends in themselves. Universal principle of right=E2=80=94quotation 6. Seems like quite a good start on this gap. Right and wrong not virtue. Treating people as ends in themselves requires respecting dignity as free agents, dignity of rational beings. Freedom of wille or willkur: freedom and capacity to make choices that are compatible with the moral law and done for the sake of it. Surprising conclusions drawn from this. Slavery and punishment. Slavery example can do whatever he wants. Capital punishment okay. Quotation 7. Ius talionis =3D=3D eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth. Doesn=E2=80=99t seem to be like treating as a means to an end. Sexual ethics=E2=80=94Kant goes much further than what he would be good at as heart of sexual ethics is respecting someone and not just using for gratification. Masturbation one of the few things worse than suicide. Cutting off hair to sell just as terrible. Subverting the dignity of humanity in your own person. Kant makes tremendous advances in pure moral philosophy in groundwork and Critique of Practical Reason. His suggestions for putting it into practice are bad. Exception: tolerance in doctrine of virtue in MoM. In abstract and need to take concrete circumstances into account. Example of Frederick the Great carrying vial of poison into battle. Different side of Kant to Kant the rigourist. Lectures on ethics, which are source of much of doctrine of right but not doctrine of virtue, given to university students, younger than we would have in a university now, he saw himself in those lectures as not required to do philosophy but required to inculcate sound principles of living one=E2=80=99s life. So is departing from what we would consider sensible views and reflecting bourgeois morality of the time. Thinks this is his job to get the young people to behave themselves. *** Happiness Not clear on what this is. Quotation 5. =E2=80=9CHe does love triads.=E2= =80=9D Universal principle of right puts limits on pursuing my own happiness. Fit one=E2=80=99s own happiness in with the happiness of others. Also says need to universalise and not give special weight to one=E2=80=99s own happiness (like later utilitarians). Williams regards this as a great mistake as need to leave room for people to follow their personal projects without obligation to think of welfare of others on same basis as their own. Kant really is putting forward: duty to will happiness of others as vigorously as I will my own; my own happiness mustn=E2=80=99t dominate my concerns. =E2=80=98Persons, Character & Morality=E2=80=99, Williams. *** Kantian constructivism Rawls ascribes some part of his view to Kant. Quotation 10. Rawls sees Kant as building morality from a conception of the person which is an interesting strategy but can=E2=80=99t be described as Kantian. Kant not concerned with any particular notion of a person except for the conception of rationality. Korsgaard tries to go further than Rawls. Quotation 9. If have values we value valuing (most critics of K have said that this doesn=E2=80= =99t follow). Quotation 8. Argument seems to just be invalid. Not inconsistent to value your rational choice but not to value slavery. Kant agrees with Millian experiments of living until conflicts with each other and moral law; they all become ends for me. **** Where does the obligation to be rational come from? Rawls: we just are rational beings broadly speaking much of the time. Share common ideal of rationality. Obligation comes from ourselves if we come from relevant parts of Europe and North America. Kant says it comes from objective moral law. Emphasised by point that rationality binding on all rational beings as such, not just on products of the enlightenment. Choices we would make in these ideal circumstances (veil of ignorance) don=E2=80=99t seem very motivating. Two points on sheet but really just one point. Kant: pure practical reason. Rawls & Korsgaard: inside of most decent people. Kantian constructivism is not really Kantian. May be an interesting and defensible (Rawls; K just interesting but not defensible) nonetheless. *** End of chapter 2 At end of chapter 2 Kant says that all he=E2=80=99s been doing so far is analysing common conception of morality. Has not shown morality is not just a mere phantom of the brain. Reasons: not capable of acting on objective reasons as they require free will (this is chapter 3). Others dealt with already is briefly, which will be looked at the beginning of next time. Disappointing yet puzzling defence of morality not a phantom of the brain. Mainly cos =E2=80=98freedom=E2=80=99 used in two different ways. ** Lecture 6 *** From last time For the Kantian constructivists the moral law only motivates hypthetically; it is reduced to a hypothetical imperative. Now onto Chapter 3. John Mackie=E2=80=99s thought that we are mistaken in seeing the moral law as objective and prescriptive because no such thing could exist does not do anything so far as Kant hasn=E2=80=99t dealt with this so far. *** Why might morality be a mere phantom of the brain? (i)=E2=80=94most elegant proponent of this view: Hume, upon whom Kant had given lectures so well aware of this PoV. (ii)=E2=80=94obeying cos sent to hell otherwise no better than obeying Hitl= er and Stalin cos otherwise be punished. (iii)=E2=80=94for quite a lot of her life, Philippa Foot maintained a form = of naturalism like this, things that conduce to human flourishing, words like =E2=80=98needs=E2=80=99 and =E2=80=98flourishing=E2=80=99 have hidden = moral content so this is very hard to do. (iii) not strong enough for morality. **** Objections to Hume ***** First objection Hasn=E2=80=99t discussed (i) as much as we would expect given that he=E2=80= =99s lectured on Hume. =E2=80=9CWe cannot take it seriously=E2=80=9D=E2=80=94Mackie might say yeah= sure we can=E2=80=99t do it in real life. Be wary of common Kantian move, there=E2=80=99s no alternative to believing something, =E2=80=9Ccan=E2=80=99t but take it seriously=E2=80=9D. His whol= e theory of the external world rests on thesis that there are beliefs and claims about the applicability of concepts like cause, object and the like which we simply can=E2=80=99t do without. It=E2=80=99s gotta be right because we ca= n=E2=80=99t think and operate otherwise, can=E2=80=99t articulate the world to ourselves otherwise. Now: can=E2=80=99t make proper sense of morality without having it as objective. ***** Second objection Double objection. Humean views have to be about humans but no account of humans or human society is sufficient for the universality that morality requires, binding on all rational beings as such. Then: universal in sense of categorical imperative, of treating everyone with equal respect (as ends in themselves). Quotation 1 (every other system refers to every other Hume-like system, not Kant=E2=80=99s). Kant: sentiments strong to those close to us so it can=E2= =80=99t possibly be a basis for morality! =E2=80=9Cif our friends, in the same college, in the same house, were in similar difficulties.=E2=80=9D Any philosopher, or any person really, saying =E2=80=9Cconsdier the matter a-right=E2=80=9D=E2=80=94serious problem for me, I think I might have a way= around it, here it is. Perspective=E2=80=94can correct things in terms of judgements, e.g. hand looking same size as window from here, but Hume is just talking about expressions of feelings, so their content can=E2=80=99t outrun that of feeling, and can=E2=80=99t appeal to something like perspective to get round that difficulty. So Hume can=E2=80=99t account for the universality of our moral claims. Our thoughts don=E2=80=99t carry our feelings with them, need some extra element that Hume hasn=E2=80=99t provided to account for this mo= ve From=20feelings to thoughts. Ralph: this is effectively Kant=E2=80=99s objection to Hume, and is in fact right. *** Chapter 3 Why doesn=E2=80=99t Kant just settle for ordinary compatibilism. Very popular, and strong Kantian free will very much disliked. Quotation 4, calls this view a wretched subterfuge. Freedom of the turnspit. Freedom of the marianette. Who is it who thought that it was just a matter of quibbling with words? HUME. Ch. 8 of enquiry, very neat exposition of compatibilism. Vigorously dismissing Hume at that point. Because essence of freedom is autonomy property which a will has of being a law unto itself. Modern incompatibilist lines: strong free will view: Robert Chisem, Gary Watson =E2=80=98Free Will=E2=80=99, good introduction to range of poss= ible theories, but it=E2=80=99s a philosophy book so largely giving a range of impossible theories, as all philosophy books do. (not just saying this as a joke; meta-phil?) Only other kinds of rational being: one, just intellectual intuition, awareness=3D=3Dthinking, this could only be god; two, use other forms of intuition than space and time. This been discussed recently. Strawson in /Individuals/ describes a possible world in which there is no space but rather a dimension of sounds which allows us to do the same thing as space. Not obvious that something else couldn=E2=80=99t work. More difficult to find an alternative to time but not necessarily impossible. Book 3 ch. 5 of Aristotle=E2=80=99s Ethics does have whether ethics can be voluntary but free will and determinism problem hadn=E2=80=99t yet formed itself. For first few pages of ch. 3 he seems to have lost track of difference between two kinds of will, Wille and Willk=C3=BCr. May be what he has in a mind when he says in a note =E2=80=9Cfreedom is the greatest good and the greatest evil=E2=80=9D. Quotation 2 refers to showing that in spatio-temporal world every event has a cause. Sets up an antinomy, an apparent contradiction. Theoretical philosophy can only establish determinism, or freedom, gives us two sides of antinomy. When we recognise that real world is outside of causal order, there=E2=80=99s no contradiction anymore. Theoretical reason can recognise that we are free as a possibility, not as an actuality; practical reason can supposedly do better here and establish that we are actually free. 448, v contested and difficult passage. Argument then seems to be about how we think of ourselves, not how things are. This is the move above mentioned. So: disregard the remark that from a practical point of view we are really free, just obscures things to put it in here. He says thinking of ourselves and free and being bound my moral law are =E2=80=98reciprocal=E2=80=99/equivalent concepts. Computers are progra= mmed and can reason better than us. No ground to ascribe to them any freedom involving respect for an objective law. Kant=E2=80=99s reply: get results through luck rather than judging based on reason, not get them /because/ they are right. If you=E2=80=99re better at maths than me you=E2=80=99re j= ust better programmed, not more attentive to the demands of reason than I. Not a decisive reply. Evolved in such a way that we have moral considerations bred into us, correct inductive inferences and mathematical calculations. Kant=E2=80=99s answer: we are beings which belo= ng to the world of things in themselves, and as such beings, we are not conditioned by the chain of causes that one finds in the physical world of appearances. As human beings living, thinking and acting in time, we are determined by these causes that act upon us, and so no real scope for the being acting in time to behave in a way that=E2=80=99s n= ot in principle predictable. Kant working for a kind of compatibilism very far from usual wretched subterfuge. Can take up two stand points because we belong to two realms. Our status as free agents allows us to be influenced by reason in the noumenal world (underlies phenomenal), if we choose to. Choices I make there is ground of how the real world turns out? (S)=E2=80=94choices must be made at noumenal level. Virtue or lack of it virtue or lack of it of a noumenal entity. To what extent does this make sense? How can I be both empirically determined and from the noumenal point of view free? How can noumenal level and phenomenal level interact at all? How to make sense of notions of action, choice, agency in a world without time or space? Map world of appearances back onto noumenal world. ** Lecture 7 Kant doesn=E2=80=99t think objection that we are determined is decisive. Quotation 8 from last time, he knows he hasn=E2=80=99t shown it yet. Reason is not something that can motivate us as a slice of pudding could, it=E2=80=99s a motivation on a different level. Kant spends a couple of pages wailing about this circle he=E2=80=99s in. Circle: p. 450. What=E2=80=99s Plato=E2=80=99s view of the soul/the human/us? Where are we= =E2=80=94are we stuck in the world of appearances or in reality i.e. the world of the forms? Extend =E2=80=98knowledge=E2=80=99 broadly, as moral law itself synthetic a= priori, though he doesn=E2=80=99t say it=E2=80=99s knowledge, even though we can be= sure of it and aware of it being binding on us. Acquire knowledge about the world in two ways: reading knowledge off it, and into it. So the world we know can only be one in which we have read many of our own ways of looking at it into it. The empirical world is real for any everyday purposes, true as anyone says it. Truth in the world of appearances is facts in the world. Good enough truth for anyone=E2=80=99s everyday purposes. Space/time allow us to separate things, see where they are /etc./ Things that apply to all rational beings need to be schematised for spatio-temporal world, and we get from this that every event has a cause, that there are substances and some single substance which lasts throughout time. This may be going a little far, too hopeful. Without these forms of intuition we can have no experience at all. So no point being sceptical about them. Hume is right that we can get cause from experience, but he=E2=80=99s wrong to say that we can use substitutes like projecting familiarity. We need a notion of genuine causal necessity, and this is indispensable to us. Without that notion of causality involving strong necessary connection, we can=E2=80=99t make sense of our experience. In particular, need it to distinguish objectively occurring events from events subjectively ordered in my mind. Kant contemptuous of the boundless sea of metaphysics, without any rules, using concepts to imagine what the world might be like beyond the limits of spatial-temporal experience: futile endeavour. Just doing suduku. Spend afternoon having metaphysical fantasies if you like but don=E2=80=99t want to think you=E2=80=99re getting any truth from = that. Knowledge limited to realm of possible experience. Quotation 3=E2=80=94takes existence of moral law as starting point as he ta= kes ?? as starting point in theoretical philosophy. apodeitically=E2=80=94has the certainty of mathematics =E2=80=98deduction=E2=80=99 =3D=3D =E2=80=98justification=E2=80=99 for Kant. Awareness of moral law justifies believing we are free. Moral law giving us an ought that we can never obey would be empty. Controversial first step Ralph will recommend, most people go the other way around: the world of appearances is obviously the real world as far as all ordinary purposes are concerned. Kant postulates things in themselves just a theoretical possibility, or Kant didn=E2=80=99t mean t= hey are important at all and only reality is sensory world (he very frequently negates it himself though; not sustainable really). Another: world of things in themselves a reality, but a reality which can in no way affect us. Can leave this reality aside for all our ordinary purposes. Kant saying we can=E2=80=99t do this because our ordina= ry purposes include action. Only through freedom of intelligible self that you can perform moral action. Clearing away knowledge to make way for faith in preface of pure reason is giving a lessar place to conclusions that he draws in moral matters. Ralph thinks this is unlikely. Glaube can mean religious faith and Kant will allow that to some extent. But Glaube not any less factive than knowledge. Conclusions of Critique of Practical Reason we are entitled to assert as true, constitute knowledge from a practical point of view (imprecise terminology). So Kant means what he says: real world is the intelligible world. World of appearances is not an illusion, but the way that things appear to us differs from the underlying reality in some key respects. One key respect is that the place our free action can play in the world is obscured. This is a method to soften you up to a different way of looking at it to the standard way, doesn=E2=80=99t provide= a solution cos problem arises from contradiction. Wood criticises Ralph=E2=80=94quotation 7. Things in past the problem, not future. Not possible to reconcile all Kant=E2=80=99s texts, as he shifted between two different pictures of the real, noumenal world. Sometimes he shifted between these two pictures within the course of a page or two. One is picture that talking of a timeless world naturally suggests to us. From account of timeless god from Boethius and Aquinas, looks at world like a man standing on a hill looking at a long long road, can see entire road, but people on road only see their bit of road and moving along it, god is in no place on the road, god is in no place in our time. Boethius uses a word for =E2=80=98simultaneous= ly=E2=80=99 which is dodgy because then god in time again. On this picture, back to Kant, how can we be responsible for out little bits of it in the way our ordinary moral consciousness requires. Being responsible for fall of Carthage can=E2=80=99t fit ordinary picture. Picture of making moral choice outside of time doesn=E2=80=99t fit picture either. I wrestle with a particular problem: Kant recognises this most of the time. So one model, quasi-theological. Second model: world of things in themselves not so very much outside time at all. At least possible that Kant=E2=80=99s world of things in themselves in an order that nowadays we would call a temporal order. Lot of concern among Kant scholars for his refusal to say that world of things in themselves /might/ be spatio-temporal. When Kant talks about time he=E2=80=99s talking about time from our respective as we feel it through time passing, indexical with =E2=80=98now=E2=80=99 and =E2=80=98her= e=E2=80=99. Ralph agrees that weeks in term fly by in that no sooner you=E2=80=99ve started one then you=E2=80=99re ploughing through the next, but when you lo= ok back yesterday seems ages ago because you=E2=80=99ve done so much since the= n. So phenomelogical nature of time for us important. McTaggart, unreality of time, A-series and B-series. Quotation 5. McTaggart argues that A-series incoherent as death of Queen Anne is at one time future, at one time present, at one time past=E2=80=94contradictory properties of being all three, so time is unreal. Quotation 6. Kant can think of things in themselves existing in a C-series, parallel to our time series. We make decisions at points (=E2=80=98times=E2=80=99) in = C-series, affecting spatio-temporal world. Don=E2=80=99t have to think of real world= as wholly non-spatial and non-temporal, quasi-space and quasi-time systematically very similar to ours. This gives Kant his second picture. Ralph doesn=E2=80=99t think we can reconcile what Kant says about free choi= ce with /all/ the things he says about determinism in First and Second Critique, but we can do it with /most/ of them, and Kant weakens his claims in determinism in subsequent years, no doubt in order to avoid this paradox. If we can make that picture stick, and contradiction not a contradiction, then we do have an interesting possibility before us. Human agency, and the agency of rational beings more generally, can be free in the strong sense that he requires it to be. Determinism in the very strict sense in which it is often understood, will not be true: some things in the world not determined. Nevertheless our way of looking at the world is bound to be one which assumes determinism for the purposes of investigation because we should never give up looking for causes, and so our ways of looking at ourselves require us never to give up looking for opportunities to choose free action even if we see ourselves as very constrained by the causal forces working on us. Strawson very sympathetic to Kant. Putting in modern terms the pressures that there are to see each other as free and the pressures to see each other as causally explicable. Can=E2=80=99t view people as peo= ple and have personal relationships with them unless you can regard them as free agents, and resent what they do. Resentment and love are based on an assumption of freedom which we can=E2=80=99t give up. Strawson= =E2=80=99s own attitude changed, in that article worry that determinism the real and dominant truth. Later said that these are two ways of looking at the world, scientific way, human way. Am I first a scientist or a human being first? Not hard to answer. 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