* Inconsistency between #+OPTIONS and EXPORT_OPTIONS on LaTeX heading levels
@ 2011-12-11 12:25 Sean Whitton
2011-12-11 15:55 ` Bastien
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sean Whitton @ 2011-12-11 12:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: emacs-orgmode
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Hello,
When I set #+OPTIONS: H:1, I get what I expect: \section{} is the only
heading used and second level outline levels are converted to whatever
my org-export-lower-levels is set to, and the table of contents just has
the \section{}s in it.
When I set EXPORT_OPTIONS to H:1, I get \section{} and \subsection{} in
the body text, but the table of contents only lists \section{}s.
I want the first behaviour myself, but in any case, shouldn’t this be
consistent between the two?
Thanks.
S
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: Inconsistency between #+OPTIONS and EXPORT_OPTIONS on LaTeX heading levels
2011-12-11 12:25 Inconsistency between #+OPTIONS and EXPORT_OPTIONS on LaTeX heading levels Sean Whitton
@ 2011-12-11 15:55 ` Bastien
2011-12-11 16:01 ` Sean Whitton
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Bastien @ 2011-12-11 15:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Sean Whitton; +Cc: emacs-orgmode
Hi Sean,
Sean Whitton <sean@silentflame.com> writes:
> When I set #+OPTIONS: H:1, I get what I expect: \section{} is the only
> heading used and second level outline levels are converted to whatever
> my org-export-lower-levels is set to, and the table of contents just has
> the \section{}s in it.
>
> When I set EXPORT_OPTIONS to H:1, I get \section{} and \subsection{} in
> the body text, but the table of contents only lists \section{}s.
EXPORT_OPTIONS is for a tree, while #+OPTIONS is for the whole doc.
> I want the first behaviour myself, but in any case, shouldn’t this be
> consistent between the two?
Maybe you can send an org file as an example?
Thanks,
--
Bastien
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: Inconsistency between #+OPTIONS and EXPORT_OPTIONS on LaTeX heading levels
2011-12-11 15:55 ` Bastien
@ 2011-12-11 16:01 ` Sean Whitton
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Sean Whitton @ 2011-12-11 16:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: emacs-orgmode
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Hi Bastien,
On 11 Dec 2011 at 15:55Z, Bastien wrote:
>> When I set #+OPTIONS: H:1, I get what I expect: \section{} is the
>> only heading used and second level outline levels are converted to
>> whatever my org-export-lower-levels is set to, and the table of
>> contents just has the \section{}s in it.
>> When I set EXPORT_OPTIONS to H:1, I get \section{} and \subsection{}
>> in the body text, but the table of contents only lists \section{}s.
> EXPORT_OPTIONS is for a tree, while #+OPTIONS is for the whole doc.
Ah perhaps I should have been clearer when describing what I did, sorry.
I set #+OPTIONS at the top of the file, and EXPORT_OPTIONS in the
properties drawer for the tree I actually want, as you describe, as two
cases, and then exported just the tree with C-c C-e 1 d in both cases,
to get the behaviour described.
The point is that I require the #+OPTIONS to get what I want, when it
ought to just work with the EXPORT_OPTIONS since I am just exporting
that tree.
>> I want the first behaviour myself, but in any case, shouldn’t this
>> be consistent between the two?
> Maybe you can send an org file as an example?
Certainly, you’ll find a stripped down file attached.
Thanks!
S
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#+OPTIONS: H:1
* Lectures MT11—R Walker—Kant’s Ethics
:PROPERTIES:
:EXPORT_FILE_NAME: lectures-kantsethics-walker
:EXPORT_TITLE: Kant’s ethics lectures
:EXPORT_AUTHOR: Lecturer: Ralph Walker
:EXPORT_DATE: MT11
:EXPORT_OPTIONS: H:1 todo:nil <:nil
:END:
** Lecture 1
*** Kant’s general philosophy
A problem how to fit his moral philosophy with his general philosophy,
in particular his views on freedom. We need to be free in a very
strong sense for his moral system. Pure practical reason doesn’t
belong to the causal order yet it must influence us. Theoretical
philosophy says that we don’t have this freedom.
Most people say this is unresolvable nowadays (not all of them).
**** Kant’s crazy metaphysics
Kant’s solution is separating world of free agents from world of space
and time. We can know a lot about this world as we rely on both sense
experience and principles we know independently of experience: we
apply /a priori/ concepts like the concept of cause (disagrees with Hume
here). Kant thinks he can prove that this must be true of the world
as we can know it.
**** Where he’s coming from
Kant is reacting first against the rationalists (C&D) and reacting to
(British) empiricists.
At one stage Kant accepted Hume’s view ∵ he wasn’t happy with
rationalists grasping principles out of the air (they all got
different things). I say C&D this, you say C&D that. This won’t do
because Hume and co. end up in untenable scepticism. Can’t account
for indispensible notions like causality, senses objectivity.
Geometry and arithmetic tell us truths about space and time, that Hume
says we can’t have.
***** Example of incongruent counterparts
Left and right hand gloves: problem with empirical philosophy is that
it makes sense that there could consist of a universe with just a left
hand glove and one with a right hand glove and these would be
different. Yet how can they be different without knowledge of space
itself? The experiential data is the same in both cases.
***** Unsatisfactory alternatives
Obvs. not happy with Descartes’ a priori knowledge of the world due to
god argument failing—also, Kant doesn’t think you can ever prove the
existence of god using reason.
**** Metaphysics again
Only way to explain things like this is that the world as knowable by
humans is dependent on the way that we know it, dependent on us.
There is a reality of things as they in themselves beneath this, but
we can never know what it is like.
************Isn’t this a bit of a truism? Neurath’s
boat.******************
Some kind of faith possible about the real world. Distinguished from
knowledge of sensory world.
**** Moral truths
Doesn’t give a parallel account. He seems to think that moral truths
take us beyond the realm of what we can know, and they give us some
kind of contact with reality itself—disputed interpretation.
Why can we be so confident in our a priori principles (e.g. induction)
that govern our experience? They are innate but that’s no guarantee
of their reliability.
*** The Groundwork itself
Written as a semi-popular book. Kant was surprised that first
Critique didn’t go down well with the public. Review said Kant was
reheating Berkeley’s idealism. Therefore wrote Prolegomena,
semi-popular, intended to make everybody understand exactly what he
was saying. Failed ofc…
On ethics he does the popular work first. Kant introduces an idea,
doesn’t go into complexities but doesn’t say that there even are
complexities. This has caused almost all problems of with
understanding the Groundwork.
Three formulations do come to the same thing but it’s very hard to see
how they come together as he’s suppressed detail on his initial
formulation. Could have put a lot of philosophers out of work if he
hadn’t done this.
*** Methodology
Starting ethics by looking at ordinary people—Plato, Aristotle, Rawl’s
‘reflective equilibrium’.
**** ‘Analytic’ and ‘synthetic’
Has nothing to do with analytic and synthetic propositions at all.
Analyse existing beliefs and then build up from truth of morality
from, apparently, nowhere. Indeed Kant says we can’t start from
nowhere so he says all he can do is remove the objections.
*** The Analytic Argument
Reveals that morality is essentially rational. All moral philosophy
dependent on the part that is pure. Confusion from failure to realise
that fundamental principles of morals must be a priori (v. diff. to
Mill—Mill says all comes from induction, in what leads to happiness or
not, but greatest happiness principle doesn’t seem to be inductively
derived). This is something ordinary people believe, when analysed.
Disagrees with Hume, and people who says its evolutionary. Can’t
learn them from experience for Hume’s ‘can’t derive an ought from an
is’. Reason behind all this is that moral principles are action
guiding. We can’t recognise something as right or wrong and not be
moved by that.
Can’t recognise that something is your duty without being motivated by
it (even if you’re more motivated to do something else).
**** This is strange
When Mackie says that objective facts are weird, he’s talking
specifically about Kant.
**** Compared to theoretical principles of reasoning
We recognise an argument is valid and it’s compelling, but we don’t
have to follow it. Hard to in a basic syllogism but there are many
other examples. Mother refuses to believe son is dead in the army.
All the evidence she could possibly have yet fails to accept it.
**** Ends and means
Moral law doesn’t derive value from anything but itself: not god, not
because happiness is good (other way round in the last case). Very
opposite to position of Mill and Epicureans. Ends derive their value
From the law, Mill says the other way around.
***** First section—talents and virtues seen as good
Aristotelian virtues have no value in themselves. Value only if used
in accordance with the demands of morality. All of them can be
misused (e.g. cool (courageous) scoundrel).
** Lecture 2
*** Initial few paragraphs
Another example of us not following the pull of reason are logical
difficulties surrounding impossible triangle of god. There might be
ways round this—got to be very careful with one’s own thinking.
Holy wills don’t have imperatives as imperative means possibility of
not following it, which god and angels don’t have.
Happiness and health can’t be mis-used as virtues can be, but can’t be
good in themselves because if distributed badly they are bad as far as
they are distributed to the bad people.
Function of reason cannot be to produce happiness. Kant doesn’t
normally talk about functions. Explanation: Nichomachean Ethics,
which Kant is disagreeing with in these first few sections. Courage
not good in itself for Kant, is for Aristotle.
Aristotle also says power, honour, health can be a component of the
best life, but Kant says not of value in themselves.
Nancy Sherman attempts to assimilate Kant to Aristotle; Ralph will be
following this. Disagreements are over a caricature of Aristotle
coming from Kant himself and common readings. All philosophers do
this, inc. Aristotle, when they want to be original or try to reduce
their apparent/notice of agreement.
Purple passage, step-motherly nature: consequences ABSOLUTELY
irrelevant. Not an answer to a more sophisticated form of
utilitarianism in terms of intentions (though he’ll object to that too
because /no end has value/ independently of the moral law).
*** First proposition
Doesn’t enunciate first proposition but reasonable to conclude that by
a later reference to ‘our second proposition’. Quotation 1 seems to
say that you can act morally only if you absolutely hate it.
Overstating his case as he often does when trying to make his position
readily understood. Considering a special case: initially had no
moral inclination and just acting from disposition, which is morally
worthless, because liable to be mis-used.
Your benevolence must be subordinate to the moral principles which
must remain in control. Second-order motive of morality saying
whether situation is appropriate for friendliness, first-order motive
to be friendly.
Still helpful because then you don’t have to struggle to do the right
thing. Praise and encouragement but not esteem due towards such
virtues.
Aristotle—phroenesis, practical wisdom, controls virtues. Kant taking
precisely the same position. Practical wisdom a second order motive.
Possible for moral law to be a first order motive but more commonly
second order motive.
Alan somebody sees duty as having to constrain inclinations. Makes
Kant’s position unattractive. Walker thinks it’s not such a problem
when you consider first and second order motives.
*** Questions
Bernard Williams says Kant psychologically hedonistic. “Bernard
Williams not the most reliable person on the people he’s attacking,
like everyone else”. If anything it’s psychological eudaimonism. An
area he doesn’t tell us enough about. Williams right that he gives a
pretty crude picture of acting in non-moral way—cos he wants to deal
with it quickly.
Kant says there’s a measure of inclination we can never get rid of;
can’t train ourselves into the position of god OR when all other
inclinations subsumed to morality anyway.
Book on religion—radical evil in human beings. “We are always faced
ultimately with the choice.” Always a struggle.
Terminology—’right’ if done in accordance with law; ‘good’ only if
motivated by duty. Splits metaphysics of right—primarily about
law—and m of virtue in his Metaphysics of Morals.
As for Plato, motivation absolute heart of morals.
*** Second proposition
Some people say that this makes Kant seem like he cares about no
ends. Quotation 5 shows this is wrong. End derives from moral law,
not the moral law from the end. Also see Quotation 4. There are
ends, that the moral law lays down for us, perfection and happiness.
*** Third proposition
What does it mean to say a feeling self-produced by a rational
concept. Doesn’t mean what we mean by feeling at all: compulsion to
act inseparable from an awareness of the moral law. Quotation 6.
Reverence is morality itself considered as an incentive. Quotation 7.
*** Maxims
Quotation 8. Objective maxim is the maxim I adopt when I say I shall
obey the moral law; definition doesn’t make this an oxymoron.
What Kant expects in a maxim is more than we might ordinarily build
into our concept of intention. What I am undertaking needs to be
thought our pretty carefully in the formulation of my maxim. Filling
out—makes his maxims more intelligible. Commit suicide->commit
suicide out of self-love. Maxims should include all morally relevant
circumstances.
E.g. when drunk, not that there’s no maxim, just not well thought-out,
doesn’t incorporate moral law as part of it. You might think you are
but you would be wrong.
Kant does not think that everyone who believes themselves to be acting
out of duty is acting out of duty. You can easily be wrong. This is
important to avoid a fascile objection to Kant.
Genocide, guy on trial, in all relevant circumstances he did think he
was doing his duty to categorical imperative. But he hadn’t thought
it through enough. Kant acutely aware of the ease with which we are
deceived, Quotation 9. Duty won’t necessarily be what you were taught
at school or in the Hitler youth.
Has example of an inquisitor in late middle ages. Torturing heretics.
Didn’t enjoy it but doing it cos it was his duty. This person is
confusing an order from other people with the rational moral law and
therefore guilty. Not been paying attention to pure (practical)
reason. We always do have access to the moral law within us, but this
may well require reflection.
** Lecture 3
*** Chapter 1
An initial formulation of the categorical imperative is seen in
chapter 1. Will doing the right thing doesn’t /produce/ anything good
for itself cos good just doing your duty.
Seems strange when he says this then gives formulation…?
What does universal law mean? Binds all rational beings, as such.
At 408. Or just means: requires like cases to be treated alike. This
is how he uses it but doesn’t seem to follow from the above. A law
could be discriminatory though and could bind rational beings, but
clearly not treating like cases alike. Slides from one meaning of law
to another.
‘First principle of morality’ used by ordinary conscious is basic CI.
Moral philosophy helps us keep motivations separate but not strictly
necessary.
**** An Interpretation
Quotation 8. ‘content’
Is he talking about more than what I /want/? Ralph will argue there is
something more, a concept of rational willing. Will is not just
want/content but rationally will.
This passage is evidence against Ralph’s interpretation. But first
chapter written less carefully as he knew he’d be coming back to it
later.
*** Chapter 2
Quotation 1—can’t derive morality from experience. 408 again (not on
list of quotations in the end). ‘apodeictic’ (logically) necessary.
Used in Aristotelian logic for a proof, an apodeisis or something.
Moral law has same status as logical claims proved with deduction
though not acquired through a proof.
**** Types of imperatives
To have a will is to act in accordance with one’s idea of the law.
Has problematic hypothetical imperatives (e.g. getting a hot dog)
vs. assertoric hypothetical imperatives, just because he likes triads,
latter those that apply to all of us because we all have e.g. desire
for happiness. Categorical applies even when we don’t desire
happiness.
**** Synthetic and analytic
Categorical: ‘synthetic a priori propositions’, hypothetical
are ‘analytic’ which just means don’t raise any problems. Who wills
the ends will the means, truth of pure practical reason. Ralph: using
‘will’ in his technical sense: if rationally want the end, it’s
rational to want the means. Kant doesn’t say it’s impossible to will
the end but not want the means, but it’s irrational.
*** The first formulation
Kant postpones dealing with issue of whether there are any categorical
imperatives until ch. 3; Mackie would say if they could exist are
queer, or we might just say there aren’t any.
Kant has given us no ground to say that hair colour is irrelevant when
deciding whether sufficiently similar circumstances. Just says that
‘morally relevant’ circumstances must be taken into account but this
is obviously circular…
This formulation is leaving an awful lot open. This law can’t rule
anything out. Some help offered by later formulations.
Reformulates as formula of law of nature. A graphic test, helps us
when we have a picture we can imagine. Conforms to parents saying
what happens if everyone did that. May not be much use before we know
more detail about all this, lots of blanks to fill in.
Can yield lots of specific categorical imperatives once we’ve
understood the big one. Going to have to bring down to something
applicable to our everyday lives.
*** Conceiving of a world in which no one makes true promises
Inconceivable? No, doesn’t seem to be. Everyone might be stupid
enough to think that it’s only them making lying promises.
What about bribery? Refusing bribes will collapse if everyone does,
so is there no requirement for me not to, is refusing bribes now
wrong?
Response: Promising has an end prescribed by the moral law and
refusing bribes does not. Bribery is wrong, promising isn’t. This
isn’t captured in Kant’s description of what’s wrong with the lying
promises case. Couldn’t rationally will it because rationally wills
that institution of promising continues but it wouldn’t be rational to
will that bribery continues.
Notion of rational willing playing a large part in what’s going on,
clearer in neglecting talents example. Fine example, side of Kant we
don’t always meet. Kant “evidently thinks this would be rather fun”
w.r.t. south sea islands. Can’t do this because as a rational being
he must will something else.
Rational willing playing same substantive role here as in above case
of promising and bribery.
‘Will’ in formulations is a very loaded concept. Then four examples
become a lot more comprehensible. More formulations to fill out
conception of rational will.
Possible to have world where we live on our own but couldn’t be
rationally willed. Some have taken it as an argument that it’s about
wanting but that doesn’t get us there. Conflict between my duty and
my desire again.
*** Second formulation: treat people as ends not means
@ 429 in Academy version.
Caught popular imagination. Useful content. Will deal with making
exception to enslave red-haired people.
** Lecture 4
*** First four formulations
Formulation 3 is a helpful way of picturing to yourself what would
happen and then you ask if you can will it. Exactly the same test as
the first two formulations, but just a graphic way of putting it.
Quotations 1 and 2 reflect Kant saying a maxim passing the test is
admissible but not necessary (he’s sometimes said not to say this).
Quotation 2 makes it very explicit. Imagine ‘let everyone in my
circumstances eat meat for dinner’; universalisable but don’t have to
do it. Drinking 14 pints at dinner may actually be morally wrong
(probably not universalisable pragmatically and certainly doesn’t tend
to perfection).
*** What is a maxim?
Your maxim is simply your intention?
**** Counter-examples
Onora O’Neill uses counter-example, I shall buy toy trains when I want
but never sell any. Doesn’t look to be universalisable. You’re
assuming that there’s a market in toy trains. Tacit assumptions, and
decision to buy toy trains in a world in which no-one sells them:
just can’t have this intention.
Another example: I shall walk across the grass. If everyone did it
there would be no grass cos it would be a path. ‘Seems too fast as a
method of dealing with the morality of walking across the grass.’
Actually: I shall walk across the grass given that only a few people
want to do so along with me.
**** Suicide
So: Kant building in more than your explicit intention when he
considers maxims (evidence for this coming in a moment). Evidence:
examples he goes on to give. ‘*From self-love*, I will commit
suicide, if continuance means more evil than pleasure.’ Critical that
case is discussed under this self-love.
Contradiction in state of affairs, a contradiction in conception of
buying toy trains and no-one selling them and everyone walking across
grass. Objective of getting pleasure contradicted by ending life,
maybe, but not clear it’s an actual contradiction in /conception/.
Based on contingent fact that we often end up rather depressed.
In suicide and promise-keeping, a contradiction that every rational
being must will. Explicit in third and fourth examples but not in the
first two.
In non-senile works says there are probably exceptions to stuff such
as suicide. He’s not a rigourist. He’s building in motivation, he’s
definitely not just saying lying and suicide are ‘always wrong’.
**** Talents
System of nature could exist but a rational being necessarily wills
that his talents be developed. Same in fourth example.
Must take into account full maxim, background circumstances and
motivation, not just what’s present to conscious.
*** Forms and matters of maxims
Quotation 8. Form and matter. When he says his CI is formal he means
it’s general, using ‘form’ in a different sense.
Some say introduction supposed to lead us to formulation 4 in terms of
humanity. Two problems:
1) Doesn’t effectively bridge the gap.
2) If we take seriously the notion of rational willing and what we
build into it, there may really be no gap to bridge.
‘Kant is sketching an account which we have to fill out.’
*** Fourth formulation: humanity as an end in itself
Are there any ends adopted just from inclination? Hume: reason slave
of the passions. Passion==inclination. Hume uses ‘passion’ in a very
broad way as translation the Greek /pathos/ so much broader than how we
would use it. Quotation 3—affirmation. More of an argument with
Quotation 5. ‘confusing footnote’
Two confusing things about this package: firstly footnote. Postulate:
give without grounds but suppose it to be rational to take it as true.
He has in mind his First Critique views that in spatial-temporal world
we’re affected by causes not rational will. Secondly substantive not
analytic claim about human beings: every human being necessarily wills
(not just that willing is part of defn of human). Class of other
beings actual or possible in being like human beings in being able to
reason. Must view themselves as ends in themselves.
There are definitely humans who are rational but do not think of
themselves as ends, subordinate themselves, we might admire such
people, Kant doesn’t—rationality requires it. Principle of
rationality that is clearly not Humean, very parallel to principles of
rational action from Parfit and Tom Nagel. If we weren’t too
thoroughly convinced by Hume we would probably agree with these.
Irrational to be concerned with happiness now but not (at all (less
okay maybe)) tomorrow/next year. Parfit’s example: care across life
except on Tuesdays. Very odd, indeed odd enough to warrant the word
‘irrational’. Oddity not just unfamiliarity, Kant says, but
principles of pure practical reason, very similar to status of laws of
logic, highly defensible position Ralph will try and defend.
Impossible to employ other people, get them to do things that they
don’t want to do—unthought out notion of dignity. Quotation 6 is his
account. If this means we can never kill anyone, it can’t fit with
what Kant says as in other places he says killing in war and capital
punishment are okay.
Clearer and more obvious in case of promising how I’m abusing
someone. Also in talents and helping others.
*** Next formulation
Kantian constructivism by Rawls, Koorsgarrd, O’Neill. Constructing
moral law on basis of our conception of personality. Might be
relative to post-enlightenment Europe or might be more general to
humanity. He can’t mean that we construct the law individually or as
a group as he says it’s objective. Also not just a law for humans but
for all rational beings as such so can’t depend on personality.
Leading up to previous formulation using humanity and rational being
interchangeably. Has a lot to say about this in preface of
Groundwork. Pure law and then an application of it to human nature, a
job for applied ethics which he calls anthropology.
So what on earth can he mean be legislating the law if he doesn’t mean
what the constructivists say? He must mean: we prescribe it to
ourselves. Moral law motivating like the laws of logic, not just
observable: this is your motivation so a sense in which you’re
prescribing the moral law for yourself: or, one part of you does and
the other part overrides and you follow inclination.
** Lecture 5
*** Recap
Formulation 4 hidden in earlier formulations in notion of rationally
willing.
‘Making law’ paradoxical because law supposed to be binding on
rational beings as such not dependent on me, you, my choice etc.
Sounds like one is inventing the law. In line with Kantian
constructivism, Koorsgardd, originally from R.P. Wolff and developed
by Rawls and O’Neill to accept paradox.
But not actually that paradoxical because moral law is an imperative
and this is what autonomy requirement requires.
Suggests you are your true self only when acting rationally acting in
accordance with law. This notion has a very long history. Rousseau,
Plato’s /Phaedo/ and probably long before that. Echoed in St. Paul, ‘to
serve god is perfect freedom’. Same in propaganda of East Germany.
Recognising one’s position in the social order.
Kant’s use of ‘freedom’ is autonomy and freedom to do what you want.
Confusing as he uses both in different circumstances. In /Groundwork/
his presentation of the notion of freedom is confusing. In later
works, *wille* (True Will) and *willkür* (arbitrary will, more ordinary
sense of ‘will’). When acting contrary to moral law, Willkur free and
Wille not a free agent in that choice, acting heteronomously according
to desire and inclination.
*** Kingdom of ends
6 is 5 + 4. Kingdom not necessarily in the sense of requiring a king
but if there is a god he can be thought of as the king. Another
imaginative test for maxims; doesn’t provide much more. Takes us
beyond spatial-temporal world because there may be rational beings
that do not belong to it but are equally bound to the moral law.
*** Happiness and perfection
Quotation 2 is heart of doctrine of virtue and thus must be heart of
Kant’s ethics because doctrine of virtue is just the moral law. This
is what treating people as ends in themselves amounts to.
Promoting perfection of others very rarely have opportunity to do so
aside from children focus on ourselves. Why not promote our own
happiness, not an obligation because you want to do so anyway. But he
also says there are circumstances in which promoting own happiness is
a duty, Quotation 3.
*** Gap: practical ethics
Book on Robert Lowden on reading list “Kant’s Impure Ethics”—his
practical ethics and how they don’t follow from fundamental principles
articulated in these books.
Gap over what is meant by treating people as ends in themselves.
Universal principle of right—quotation 6. Seems like quite a good
start on this gap. Right and wrong not virtue. Treating people as
ends in themselves requires respecting dignity as free agents, dignity
of rational beings. Freedom of wille or willkur: freedom and capacity
to make choices that are compatible with the moral law and done for
the sake of it.
Surprising conclusions drawn from this. Slavery and punishment.
Slavery example can do whatever he wants. Capital punishment okay.
Quotation 7. Ius talionis == eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth.
Doesn’t seem to be like treating as a means to an end. Sexual
ethics—Kant goes much further than what he would be good at as heart
of sexual ethics is respecting someone and not just using for
gratification.
Masturbation one of the few things worse than suicide. Cutting off
hair to sell just as terrible. Subverting the dignity of humanity in
your own person.
Kant makes tremendous advances in pure moral philosophy in groundwork
and Critique of Practical Reason. His suggestions for putting it into
practice are bad. Exception: tolerance in doctrine of virtue in MoM.
In abstract and need to take concrete circumstances into account.
Example of Frederick the Great carrying vial of poison into battle.
Different side of Kant to Kant the rigourist.
Lectures on ethics, which are source of much of doctrine of right but
not doctrine of virtue, given to university students, younger than we
would have in a university now, he saw himself in those lectures as
not required to do philosophy but required to inculcate sound
principles of living one’s life. So is departing from what we would
consider sensible views and reflecting bourgeois morality of the time.
Thinks this is his job to get the young people to behave themselves.
*** Happiness
Not clear on what this is. Quotation 5. “He does love triads.”
Universal principle of right puts limits on pursuing my own happiness.
Fit one’s own happiness in with the happiness of others. Also says
need to universalise and not give special weight to one’s own
happiness (like later utilitarians). Williams regards this as a great
mistake as need to leave room for people to follow their personal
projects without obligation to think of welfare of others on same
basis as their own.
Kant really is putting forward: duty to will happiness of others as
vigorously as I will my own; my own happiness mustn’t dominate my
concerns. ‘Persons, Character & Morality’, Williams.
*** Kantian constructivism
Rawls ascribes some part of his view to Kant. Quotation 10. Rawls
sees Kant as building morality from a conception of the person which
is an interesting strategy but can’t be described as Kantian. Kant
not concerned with any particular notion of a person except for the
conception of rationality.
Korsgaard tries to go further than Rawls. Quotation 9. If have
values we value valuing (most critics of K have said that this doesn’t
follow). Quotation 8. Argument seems to just be invalid. Not
inconsistent to value your rational choice but not to value slavery.
Kant agrees with Millian experiments of living until conflicts with
each other and moral law; they all become ends for me.
**** Where does the obligation to be rational come from?
Rawls: we just are rational beings broadly speaking much of the time.
Share common ideal of rationality. Obligation comes from ourselves if
we come from relevant parts of Europe and North America. Kant says it
comes from objective moral law. Emphasised by point that rationality
binding on all rational beings as such, not just on products of the
enlightenment.
Choices we would make in these ideal circumstances (veil of ignorance)
don’t seem very motivating. Two points on sheet but really just one
point. Kant: pure practical reason. Rawls & Korsgaard: inside of
most decent people. Kantian constructivism is not really Kantian.
May be an interesting and defensible (Rawls; K just interesting but
not defensible) nonetheless.
*** End of chapter 2
At end of chapter 2 Kant says that all he’s been doing so far is
analysing common conception of morality. Has not shown morality is
not just a mere phantom of the brain. Reasons: not capable of acting
on objective reasons as they require free will (this is chapter 3).
Others dealt with already is briefly, which will be looked at the
beginning of next time.
Disappointing yet puzzling defence of morality not a phantom of the
brain. Mainly cos ‘freedom’ used in two different ways.
** Lecture 6
*** From last time
For the Kantian constructivists the moral law only motivates
hypthetically; it is reduced to a hypothetical imperative.
Now onto Chapter 3. John Mackie’s thought that we are mistaken in
seeing the moral law as objective and prescriptive because no such
thing could exist does not do anything so far as Kant hasn’t dealt
with this so far.
*** Why might morality be a mere phantom of the brain?
(i)—most elegant proponent of this view: Hume, upon whom Kant had
given lectures so well aware of this PoV.
(ii)—obeying cos sent to hell otherwise no better than obeying Hitler
and Stalin cos otherwise be punished.
(iii)—for quite a lot of her life, Philippa Foot maintained a form of
naturalism like this, things that conduce to human flourishing, words
like ‘needs’ and ‘flourishing’ have hidden moral content so this is
very hard to do.
(iii) not strong enough for morality.
**** Objections to Hume
***** First objection
Hasn’t discussed (i) as much as we would expect given that he’s
lectured on Hume.
“We cannot take it seriously”—Mackie might say yeah sure we can’t do
it in real life.
Be wary of common Kantian move, there’s no alternative to believing
something, “can’t but take it seriously”. His whole theory of the
external world rests on thesis that there are beliefs and claims about
the applicability of concepts like cause, object and the like which we
simply can’t do without. It’s gotta be right because we can’t think
and operate otherwise, can’t articulate the world to ourselves
otherwise.
Now: can’t make proper sense of morality without having it as
objective.
***** Second objection
Double objection. Humean views have to be about humans but no account
of humans or human society is sufficient for the universality that
morality requires, binding on all rational beings as such.
Then: universal in sense of categorical imperative, of treating
everyone with equal respect (as ends in themselves). Quotation 1
(every other system refers to every other Hume-like system, not
Kant’s). Kant: sentiments strong to those close to us so it can’t
possibly be a basis for morality! “if our friends, in the same
college, in the same house, were in similar difficulties.”
Any philosopher, or any person really, saying “consdier the matter
a-right”—serious problem for me, I think I might have a way around it,
here it is.
Perspective—can correct things in terms of judgements, e.g. hand
looking same size as window from here, but Hume is just talking about
expressions of feelings, so their content can’t outrun that of
feeling, and can’t appeal to something like perspective to get round
that difficulty. So Hume can’t account for the universality of our
moral claims. Our thoughts don’t carry our feelings with them, need
some extra element that Hume hasn’t provided to account for this move
From feelings to thoughts. Ralph: this is effectively Kant’s
objection to Hume, and is in fact right.
*** Chapter 3
Why doesn’t Kant just settle for ordinary compatibilism. Very
popular, and strong Kantian free will very much disliked. Quotation
4, calls this view a wretched subterfuge. Freedom of the turnspit.
Freedom of the marianette.
Who is it who thought that it was just a matter of quibbling with
words? HUME. Ch. 8 of enquiry, very neat exposition of
compatibilism. Vigorously dismissing Hume at that point. Because
essence of freedom is autonomy property which a will has of being a
law unto itself.
Modern incompatibilist lines: strong free will view: Robert Chisem,
Gary Watson ‘Free Will’, good introduction to range of possible
theories, but it’s a philosophy book so largely giving a range of
impossible theories, as all philosophy books do. (not just saying this
as a joke; meta-phil?)
Only other kinds of rational being: one, just intellectual intuition,
awareness==thinking, this could only be god; two, use other forms of
intuition than space and time. This been discussed recently.
Strawson in /Individuals/ describes a possible world in which there is
no space but rather a dimension of sounds which allows us to do the
same thing as space. Not obvious that something else couldn’t work.
More difficult to find an alternative to time but not necessarily
impossible.
Book 3 ch. 5 of Aristotle’s Ethics does have whether ethics can be
voluntary but free will and determinism problem hadn’t yet formed
itself.
For first few pages of ch. 3 he seems to have lost track of difference
between two kinds of will, Wille and Willkür. May be what he has in a
mind when he says in a note “freedom is the greatest good and the
greatest evil”. Quotation 2 refers to showing that in
spatio-temporal world every event has a cause. Sets up an antinomy,
an apparent contradiction.
Theoretical philosophy can only establish determinism, or freedom,
gives us two sides of antinomy. When we recognise that real world is
outside of causal order, there’s no contradiction anymore.
Theoretical reason can recognise that we are free as a possibility,
not as an actuality; practical reason can supposedly do better here
and establish that we are actually free.
448, v contested and difficult passage. Argument then seems to be
about how we think of ourselves, not how things are. This is the move
above mentioned. So: disregard the remark that from a practical point
of view we are really free, just obscures things to put it in here.
He says thinking of ourselves and free and being bound my moral law
are ‘reciprocal’/equivalent concepts. Computers are programmed and
can reason better than us. No ground to ascribe to them any freedom
involving respect for an objective law. Kant’s reply: get results
through luck rather than judging based on reason, not get them /because/
they are right. If you’re better at maths than me you’re just better
programmed, not more attentive to the demands of reason than I.
Not a decisive reply. Evolved in such a way that we have moral
considerations bred into us, correct inductive inferences and
mathematical calculations. Kant’s answer: we are beings which belong
to the world of things in themselves, and as such beings, we are not
conditioned by the chain of causes that one finds in the physical
world of appearances. As human beings living, thinking and acting in
time, we are determined by these causes that act upon us, and so no
real scope for the being acting in time to behave in a way that’s not
in principle predictable.
Kant working for a kind of compatibilism very far from usual wretched
subterfuge. Can take up two stand points because we belong to two
realms. Our status as free agents allows us to be influenced by
reason in the noumenal world (underlies phenomenal), if we choose to.
Choices I make there is ground of how the real world turns out?
(S)—choices must be made at noumenal level. Virtue or lack of it
virtue or lack of it of a noumenal entity.
To what extent does this make sense? How can I be both empirically
determined and from the noumenal point of view free? How can noumenal
level and phenomenal level interact at all? How to make sense of
notions of action, choice, agency in a world without time or space?
Map world of appearances back onto noumenal world.
** Lecture 7
Kant doesn’t think objection that we are determined is decisive.
Quotation 8 from last time, he knows he hasn’t shown it yet.
Reason is not something that can motivate us as a slice of pudding
could, it’s a motivation on a different level.
Kant spends a couple of pages wailing about this circle he’s in.
Circle: p. 450.
What’s Plato’s view of the soul/the human/us? Where are we—are we
stuck in the world of appearances or in reality i.e. the world of the
forms?
Extend ‘knowledge’ broadly, as moral law itself synthetic a priori,
though he doesn’t say it’s knowledge, even though we can be sure of it
and aware of it being binding on us.
Acquire knowledge about the world in two ways: reading knowledge off
it, and into it. So the world we know can only be one in which we
have read many of our own ways of looking at it into it. The
empirical world is real for any everyday purposes, true as anyone says
it. Truth in the world of appearances is facts in the world. Good
enough truth for anyone’s everyday purposes.
Space/time allow us to separate things, see where they are /etc./ Things
that apply to all rational beings need to be schematised for
spatio-temporal world, and we get from this that every event has a
cause, that there are substances and some single substance which lasts
throughout time. This may be going a little far, too hopeful.
Without these forms of intuition we can have no experience at all. So
no point being sceptical about them. Hume is right that we can get
cause from experience, but he’s wrong to say that we can use
substitutes like projecting familiarity. We need a notion of genuine
causal necessity, and this is indispensable to us. Without that
notion of causality involving strong necessary connection, we can’t
make sense of our experience. In particular, need it to distinguish
objectively occurring events from events subjectively ordered in my
mind.
Kant contemptuous of the boundless sea of metaphysics, without any
rules, using concepts to imagine what the world might be like beyond
the limits of spatial-temporal experience: futile endeavour. Just
doing suduku. Spend afternoon having metaphysical fantasies if you
like but don’t want to think you’re getting any truth from that.
Knowledge limited to realm of possible experience.
Quotation 3—takes existence of moral law as starting point as he takes
?? as starting point in theoretical philosophy.
apodeitically—has the certainty of mathematics
‘deduction’ == ‘justification’ for Kant.
Awareness of moral law justifies believing we are free. Moral law
giving us an ought that we can never obey would be empty.
Controversial first step Ralph will recommend, most people go the
other way around: the world of appearances is obviously the real world
as far as all ordinary purposes are concerned. Kant postulates things
in themselves just a theoretical possibility, or Kant didn’t mean they
are important at all and only reality is sensory world (he very
frequently negates it himself though; not sustainable really).
Another: world of things in themselves a reality, but a reality which
can in no way affect us. Can leave this reality aside for all our
ordinary purposes. Kant saying we can’t do this because our ordinary
purposes include action. Only through freedom of intelligible self
that you can perform moral action.
Clearing away knowledge to make way for faith in preface of pure
reason is giving a lessar place to conclusions that he draws in moral
matters. Ralph thinks this is unlikely. Glaube can mean religious
faith and Kant will allow that to some extent. But Glaube not any
less factive than knowledge. Conclusions of Critique of Practical
Reason we are entitled to assert as true, constitute knowledge from a
practical point of view (imprecise terminology).
So Kant means what he says: real world is the intelligible world.
World of appearances is not an illusion, but the way that things
appear to us differs from the underlying reality in some key
respects. One key respect is that the place our free action can play
in the world is obscured. This is a method to soften you up to a
different way of looking at it to the standard way, doesn’t provide a
solution cos problem arises from contradiction.
Wood criticises Ralph—quotation 7. Things in past the problem, not
future. Not possible to reconcile all Kant’s texts, as he shifted
between two different pictures of the real, noumenal world. Sometimes
he shifted between these two pictures within the course of a page or
two. One is picture that talking of a timeless world naturally
suggests to us. From account of timeless god from Boethius and
Aquinas, looks at world like a man standing on a hill looking at a
long long road, can see entire road, but people on road only see their
bit of road and moving along it, god is in no place on the road, god
is in no place in our time. Boethius uses a word for ‘simultaneously’
which is dodgy because then god in time again.
On this picture, back to Kant, how can we be responsible for out
little bits of it in the way our ordinary moral consciousness
requires. Being responsible for fall of Carthage can’t fit ordinary
picture. Picture of making moral choice outside of time doesn’t fit
picture either. I wrestle with a particular problem: Kant recognises
this most of the time. So one model, quasi-theological.
Second model: world of things in themselves not so very much outside
time at all. At least possible that Kant’s world of things in
themselves in an order that nowadays we would call a temporal order.
Lot of concern among Kant scholars for his refusal to say that world
of things in themselves /might/ be spatio-temporal. When Kant talks
about time he’s talking about time from our respective as we feel it
through time passing, indexical with ‘now’ and ‘here’.
Ralph agrees that weeks in term fly by in that no sooner you’ve
started one then you’re ploughing through the next, but when you look
back yesterday seems ages ago because you’ve done so much since then.
So phenomelogical nature of time for us important.
McTaggart, unreality of time, A-series and B-series. Quotation 5.
McTaggart argues that A-series incoherent as death of Queen Anne is at
one time future, at one time present, at one time past—contradictory
properties of being all three, so time is unreal. Quotation 6. Kant
can think of things in themselves existing in a C-series, parallel to
our time series. We make decisions at points (‘times’) in C-series,
affecting spatio-temporal world. Don’t have to think of real world as
wholly non-spatial and non-temporal, quasi-space and quasi-time
systematically very similar to ours. This gives Kant his second
picture.
Ralph doesn’t think we can reconcile what Kant says about free choice
with /all/ the things he says about determinism in First and Second
Critique, but we can do it with /most/ of them, and Kant weakens his
claims in determinism in subsequent years, no doubt in order to avoid
this paradox. If we can make that picture stick, and contradiction
not a contradiction, then we do have an interesting possibility before
us. Human agency, and the agency of rational beings more generally,
can be free in the strong sense that he requires it to be.
Determinism in the very strict sense in which it is often understood,
will not be true: some things in the world not determined.
Nevertheless our way of looking at the world is bound to be one which
assumes determinism for the purposes of investigation because we
should never give up looking for causes, and so our ways of looking at
ourselves require us never to give up looking for opportunities to
choose free action even if we see ourselves as very constrained by the
causal forces working on us.
Strawson very sympathetic to Kant. Putting in modern terms the
pressures that there are to see each other as free and the pressures
to see each other as causally explicable. Can’t view people as people
and have personal relationships with them unless you can regard them
as free agents, and resent what they do. Resentment and love are
based on an assumption of freedom which we can’t give up. Strawson’s
own attitude changed, in that article worry that determinism the real
and dominant truth. Later said that these are two ways of looking at
the world, scientific way, human way. Am I first a scientist or a
human being first? Not hard to answer. Kant’s reply may or may not
be the same as this.
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