From: Max Nikulin <manikulin@gmail.com>
To: emacs-orgmode@gnu.org
Subject: Re: CVE-2023-28617 (was Re: [PATCH] Fix ob-latex.el command injection vulnerability.)
Date: Thu, 11 May 2023 22:56:19 +0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <u3j374$6v7$1@ciao.gmane.io> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <87ttwvdlm9.fsf@localhost>
On 02/05/2023 18:21, Ihor Radchenko wrote:
> Max Nikulin writes:
>>
>> I posted the links as a reminder that shell commands should be avoided
>> when possible (and it does not break TRAMP) and arguments should be
>> escaped otherwise.
>
> But this patch literally fixed the problem. What else should we do?
Do you really think that it was the last unsafe shell command in the Org
code?
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git/tree/lisp/ob-ditaa.el#n101
and (shell-command pdf-cmd) below
https://git.savannah.gnu.org/cgit/emacs/org-mode.git/tree/lisp/ob-lilypond.el#n194
Of course, you may say that expanding shell constructs in :file header
argument is a feature that allows more flexibility. Personally, I
inspect Org files obtained from external resources in some dumb enough
viewer before opening them in Emacs.
>> I suppose, the issue has been received too much attention already:
>>
>> - https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2023-28617
>> - https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6003-1
>> - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2023-28617
>
> These appear to be different issues.
Linux distributions had to react to the CVE with formally high score and
updated Emacs packages applying 2 tiny patches from this thread.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-05-11 16:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-02-18 10:08 [PATCH] Fix ob-latex.el command injection vulnerability lux
2023-02-18 11:15 ` Max Nikulin
2023-02-18 11:28 ` lux
2023-02-18 11:43 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-02-19 2:31 ` lux
2023-03-06 3:17 ` lux
2023-03-07 12:35 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-03-07 13:20 ` lux
2023-03-07 13:52 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-03-07 15:06 ` Bastien Guerry
2023-03-07 15:10 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-03-07 15:31 ` Max Nikulin
2023-03-08 2:28 ` lux
2023-03-08 15:42 ` lux
2023-03-09 12:22 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-03-09 16:29 ` Max Nikulin
2023-03-11 5:12 ` lux
2023-03-11 10:47 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-03-11 10:57 ` lux
2023-03-12 11:28 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-05-01 10:56 ` Max Nikulin
2023-05-01 11:18 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-05-02 11:02 ` CVE-2023-28617 (was Re: [PATCH] Fix ob-latex.el command injection vulnerability.) Max Nikulin
2023-05-02 11:21 ` Ihor Radchenko
2023-05-11 15:56 ` Max Nikulin [this message]
2023-05-12 13:42 ` Ihor Radchenko
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